Way back when, this reviewer started writing on international higher education topics (upon the invitation of then-editor Leland C. Barrows for the UNESCO-CEPES publication, Higher Education in Europe), he was idealistic and hopeful that his sometimes racy and irreverent thought-pieces (called in the review’s style ‘Bibliographical References’ and then ‘Book Reviews and Studies’) would, in the now-somewhat overworked phrase, ‘make a difference’ if not in higher education policy realms at least in his personal professional profile.

Fast-forward to 2013, and many things have changed on both the social-role and personal-functional levels for him (and others). On the social-role level, the political, economic and policy arenas in which he worked had drastically changed – politically worldwide (9-11 in 2001) and EU accession for Romania (in 2007), economically (from high, if imbalanced, growth in both the world and the CEE area to recession and retrenchment post-2008). Policy-wise in the CEE higher education sector went from a giddy embrace of academic freedom in the early 1990s (and rapid expansion of the university sector, in Romania anyway, to meet previously frustrated desires for humanistic and social science education) to steep declines in student enrollment, reduced employment prospects for graduates, and crises of redundancies in the Faculties and Universities that had, a mere fifteen years earlier, been eager to expand. On the European and regional higher education policy stage in Romania, its coming EU accession came with a price, namely the withdraw of UNESCO from the European higher education space (as clearly indicated by the closure of the UNESCO-CEPES office in Bucharest at the end of 2011, prefigured by the cessation of Higher Education in Europe itself at the end of 2009).¹

On the personal-functional level, from 1992, this writer has had employment following these larger trends, varying from a youngish, brash lecturer with the innovative Civic Education Project of the (Soros) Open Society Foundation (now also long-gone), to the formative ongoing consultancy work with UNESCO-CEPES and its many publications beginning in 1996² to periodic lecturing in Korea and Liberia, to (thanks to then-Rector the “Lucian Blaga” University in Sibiu, Romania, Dumitru Ciocoi-Pop and the Mission Office of the Episcopal Church USA) a stable place in the Faculty of Letters and Arts there with some appreciated external funding grants.


The removal of the protective umbrella from above the institution of the university is perhaps most clearly seen in Europe in the way the university has been conceptualized in the past decade in the global (the World Bank, the OECD and, to a smaller degree, the UNESCO) and European/EU-level (the European Commission and its “modernization agenda of European universities”, the Bologna Process) discourses about the future roles of higher education in general, and of universities, or its most elite and costly segment, in particular, in evolving mature Western European societies. (23)

Put simply, with the end of the Cold-War ideological context, there is now nothing seen as ‘special’ about HE provision, as compared to other competing social welfare expenditures, such as health care or pensions. Kwiec concludes, The zero-sum game in public expenditures was nowhere more evident than in European post-communist transition countries, especially immediately following the collapse of communist regimes in 1989 and throughout the 1990s. The policy choices were hard, priorities in expenditures were hot political issues; higher education and academic research, certainly, have not been on the top of the list of public priorities’ (23-24).

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³ In addition to regular writings in Higher Education in Europe from 1996 to 2009, this reviewer was privileged to be a part of a number of publication projects at UNESCO-CEPES over the years. As publication co-editor: The English Connection: 40 Years of English Studies at ‘Lucian Blaga’ University of Sibiu. Bucharest: UNESCO-CEPES, and Presa Universitara ‘Sibiana’, 2010 [with Alexandra Mitrea and Ana-Karina Schneider]; Eurasian Inter-University Dialogues on Co-operation for Higher Education Development. Bucharest: UNESCO-CEPES, 2011 [with Peter Wells].

from 2000 to 2009. At that point, much like the decline of UNESCO-CEPES in Bucharest, the Mission Office of the Episcopal Church USA had faced financial challenges that caused it to retrench on many appointed missionary appointments. Hence, this reviewer’s hard-won stable work foundation began to become shaky at the dangerous-for-employment age of 52, causing him to find new callings to higher education fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2010, Korea in 2011, and now in far-flung Papua New Guinea in 2013! As a result of all this physical moving around the world, intellectually, he has faced many called-forth professional role changes as well, from being a social-science curricula reformer and practitioner in 1992, to being a higher education policy analyst from 1996, moving towards acting as a nascent theological philosopher from 2000, and now (with preliminary sorts taken in Liberia and Afghanistan) becoming a communication theory tasked to apply his knowledge in a (literally and figuratively grounded) rural social-development context. It has surely been several life experiences rolled into one, and he truly hopes they are shown to be complementary (and not dissipative) experiences! The key point is that he hopes, but is not certain of this showing; with Reform Protestant theologian Jürgen Moltmann, he is thus driven to seriously compare the grand eschatological vision of a ‘future perfect’ versus lesser human history visions of a ‘future imperfect’⁴. (The books under review well reflect the tensioned uncertainty between these two concepts of Moltmann’s in a more-than-widespread new ‘age of anxiety’). Moltmann begins his incisive essay, ‘The Liberation of the Future and its Anticipations in History’⁵ with this observation: Eschatology has to do with ‘the Last Things’ and, as I would argue, with ‘the first things’ too — the end of the system of this world and the beginning of the new order of all things. The subject of eschatology is the future, and more than the future. Eschatology talks about God’s future, and this is more than time itself. It is the future of time itself — time past, time present, and time to come. In his future, God comes to his creation and, through the power of his righteousness and justice, frees it for his kingdom, and makes it the dwelling place of his glory. In our language, this future in which God comes is described by the word ‘advent’, and is distinguished from the future time which we call ‘future’. Advent is expected — future develops. But the future always develops out of what we expect. What comes to meet us determines what we become. (p. 265) [reviewer’s emphasis] And what are we expecting to become in this new world (dis)order at the beginning of the 21st century? For the US (but not only) consider the blunt assessment of libertarian economist Tyler Cowen: In his recent book, Average Is Over: Powering America Beyond the Age of the Great Stagnation (New York: Dutton, 2013), he opines, ‘Our future will bring more wealthy people than ever before, but also more poor people. Rather than balancing our budget with higher taxes or lower benefits, we will allow the real wages of many workers to fall — and thus we will allow the creation of a new underclass.’ According to commentator Doyle McManus: Cowen isn’t adding or subtracting anything from what’s already happening. He’s merely forecasting based on current trends: middle-class American jobs being eliminated by automation and outsourcing, downward pressure on wages for all but the most skilled, growing inequality between the wealthy and everyone else, and elected officials who don’t seem capable of slowing those trends, let alone stopping them. And that’s not all. Cowen foresees a future in which employers constantly measure individual workers’ performance “with oppressive precision,” the better to weed out underperformers quickly: a future in which retirees, their savings exhausted, move to newly built shantytowns (like “the better dwellings you might find in a Rio de Janeiro favela”) in low-cost states like Texas; a future in which the new underclass, instead of rebelling against the elite, consoles itself with online entertainment and scientifically improved narcotics to make life palatable.

OK, at this point you’re probably asking: What kind of monster is this guy? Not a monster; merely an economist. (n.p.)⁶ McManus continues, remarking that while Cowen might not think growing economic inequality in the USA is, in itself, a problem, he (and many others, including economists) does. ‘Leave aside, for the moment, the moral question of whether an increasingly unequal society is inherently unfair. An impressive number of economists, including the liberal Robert H. Frank of Cornell, argue persuasively that inequality is also bad from a practical cost-benefit perspective — that it leads to lower economic growth, more poverty, more fragile families and, as a result, less happiness. If Cowen is right, we face a crisis over our national identity. The American dream isn’t only of success for a few high achievers; it’s about an economy that supports a healthy middle class and opportunity for the striving poor.’ Unfortunately, neither political party in the USA has the necessary combination of vision and political power to enact policies that can realistically counter the technological, economic, political and cultural upheavals driven by the analogue to digital shift that has occurred since 1985 or so, co-marked by major changes in communication and computer technologies, globalization, economic market functions, political ideology, employment profiles and work life practices, etc. in a fairly short time span.¹⁰

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9 ‘Poof goes the middle class: With wages falling and inequality increasing, new ideas are needed to prevent the emergence of a new underclass.’ According to commentator Doyle McManus: Cowen isn’t adding or subtracting anything from what’s already happening. He’s merely forecasting based on current trends: middle-class American jobs being eliminated by automation and outsourcing, downward pressure on wages for all but the most skilled, growing inequality between the wealthy and everyone else, and elected officials who don’t seem capable of slowing those trends, let alone stopping them. And that’s not all. Cowen foresees a future in which employers constantly measure individual workers’ performance “with oppressive precision,” the better to weed out underperformers quickly: a future in which retirees, their savings exhausted, move to newly built shantytowns (like “the better dwellings you might find in a Rio de Janeiro favela”) in low-cost states like Texas; a future in which the new underclass, instead of rebelling against the elite, consoles itself with online entertainment and scientifically improved narcotics to make life palatable.
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8 ‘Post goes the middle class: With wages falling and inequality increasing, new ideas are needed to prevent the emergence of a new underclass’. (Opinion/Op-Ed) Los Angeles Times (23 October, 2013). Retrieved http://www.latimes.com/opinion/commentary/la-oe-mcmanus-column-inequality-20131023,0,7173397.column#axzz2jEdWf4oD (31 October, 2013). More glibly, in ‘The Start Up of You’ a column installment written in advice-mode for recent college graduates, Thomas Friedman makes the same basic argument as Cowen does. ‘Whatever you may be thinking when you apply for a job today, you can be sure the employer is asking this: Can this person add value every hour, every day — more than a worker in India, a robot or a computer? Can he or she help my company adapt by not only doing the job today but also reinventing the job for tomorrow? And can he or she adapt with all the change, so my company can adapt and export into the fastest-growing global markets? In today’s hyperconnected world, more and more companies cannot and will not hire people who don’t fulfill those criteria’ (The New York Times [Opinion] 13 July, 2011: A27). No ‘slacker’ or any other ‘unproductive’ souls need apply! (And even if the US or European graduate applicant is as productive as one could be, does that graduate’s employment costs compare favorably to a graduate’s employment costs in India?)
9 Also see economist (and former US Secretary of Labour) Robert Reich’s movie ‘Inequality for All’, which provocatively ‘takes on’ the controversy of widening income disparity in the USA over the last thirty years.¹⁰
Andrew Ross, Professor and Chair of the Department of Social and Cultural Analysis at New York University, is the author and editor of numerous books on the sociology of work and neo-liberal influences on the global economy. In Nice Work If You Can Get It, he speaks of the here-and-now casualization of professional highly educated career profiles; becoming by the way that traditionally artistic and often non-male ‘secondary work’ profiles and markets had worked in the past. Using ‘jive’ lingo from freelance musicians, he sums up the realities of the new ‘managed professional’ work-life today in his title, creative or not:

The last three decades of deregulation and privatization have reshaped the geography of livelihoods for almost everyone in the industrialized world, and for a large slice of the population in developing countries. On the landscape of work, there is less and less terra firma. Today’s livelihoods are pursued on economic ground that shifts rapidly underfoot, and many of our old assumptions about how people can make a living are outdated pieties. No one, not even those in the traditional professions, can any longer expect a fixed pattern of employment in the course of their lifetime, and they are under more and more pressure to anticipate, and prepare for, a future in which they still will be able to compete in a changing marketplace. The rise in the percentage of contingent employment, both in low-end service sectors and in high-wage occupations, has been steady and shows no sign of leveling off. It has been accompanied by an explosion of atypical work arrangements far removed from the world of social welfare systems, union contracts, and long-term tenure with a single employer. (Locations 97-105)

Ross continues, pointing to some of the structural (technological and then political-economic) causes of this major shift in the US and global employment toplography, both for the lowly, often-illegal immigrants boarding unseaworthy boats, and high-level H-1 visa legal immigrants boarding planes leading to new lands and new jobs:

What I describe in these pages as the new geography of livelihoods is, in large part, the outcome of economic liberalization in the last two decades. NAFTA, European integration, and WTO-driven deregulation have engendered a frenetic, global traffic in jobs, capital, goods, services, and people. The rapid influx of investment into new regional markets has pushed hundreds of millions of uprooted people into the migrations streams that now crisscross the world. But though the new global economy of supply and demand is crafted to cater to investors and speculators, it is not a winner-takes-all game for them. While mass mobility facilitates the ready availability of workers, often in strained circumstances, the flighty nature of migrant labor is a source of frustration to the state’s strictures of population management and to capital-owners’ desire to control labor supply. The evasion tactics adopted by transnational migrants in their running battle with agents of repressive border policies, unfair labor regulation, detention camps, and deportation lie on the front lines of neoliberal conflict, both a consequence of discipline and a fugitive response to it. (Locations 139-147)

By this situation, the golden hopes and dreams of graduate employees of a self-managed and creative labor relations are turned into sand; not by a centralized, top-down Orwellian framework of a 1984, but of a self-controlled, ‘free-will’ framework apropos of Huxley’s Brave New World.11

In these sectors, managers and consultants have zealously promoted the condition of “free agency” as an existential test of character for youthful entrants into the workforce. In return for giving up the tedium of stable employment in a large, hierarchical organization, would-be free agents are buzzed by the thrill of proving themselves by finding out if they have what it takes to prevail in the heady swim of self-employment. Once they are in this game, some of the players thrive, but most subsist, neither as employers nor traditional employees, in a limbo of uncertainty, juggling their options, massaging their contacts, managing their overcommitted time, and developing coping strategies for handling the uncertainty of never knowing where their next project, or source of income, is coming from.12 (Locations 160-66)

Ross’s book takes us through this ‘eye of the storm’ landscape for recent college graduates, speaking of topics such as ‘creative workers and rent-seeking’ in locales such as the US, Europe the UK and a rapidly changing China, which he seems to select as the exemplar of the socio-economic transformations to come (‘Teamsters, Turtles, and Tainted Toys’) and the intricacies of promoting the knowledge society through the economic determinates of ‘knowledge capitalism’, such as disputes over copyright and Intellectual Property (IP). Ross thus observes universities behaving as global corporations with their fast-expanding off-shoring in locales such as Singapore, The United Arab Emirates, and China, i.e., ‘the rise of the global university’. To wrap up his tour de force, he closely considers Richard Florida’s thesis of creative graduates making for new creative cities (‘Maps and Charters’), concluding that the lasting economic effect of a ‘creative class’ on most urban areas is simply causing rising land prices in formally depressed areas (i.e., gentrification).

To return to Moltmann, his main concern is how the incessant globalizing pressures Ross analyzes creates four core problems both political conservatives and political progressives have a problem dealing with in a sustainable and humane way via ‘realistic’ policy options usually offered. As Moltmann (276) states, ‘The new magic word “globalization” is merely a more agreeable way of describing what people in the fifteenth century called “imperialism”. For the total commercialization of life, from the private sphere to the care of the old, we have invented the amiable euphemism “privatization”. Wicked old capitalism is now called “the global marketing of everything”. Freedom, we are told, grows with the progressive individualization of human beings, and with the demolition of the


11 Ross elaborates: ‘Once marginal on the landscape of production, it is artists, designers, and other creatives who are becoming the new model workers—self-directed, entrepreneurial, accustomed to precariously, nonstandard employment, and attuned to producing career hits. All of these features are endemic to a jackpot economy, where intellectual property is the glittering prize for the lucky few. More to the point, the proven ability of “creative clusters” and mega-events to boost land value is a key factor in the state’s attention to this sector of cognitive labor’ (Locations 269-72).

12 Ross defines such a class (in a riff off of Marx/Lenin) as: ‘the vanguard of the precariat is perceived to live with the high-wage brainworkers, whose conscientious core consists of creative workers for whom irregular employment has long been a customary way of life’. He also elaborates here the thinking of some recent Italian post-operaismo theorists (Locations 698-699) on the role of ‘immaterial labor’ plays in the current global economy.
particularist communities which restricted their individual liberties.\textsuperscript{13} The intractable results of this technologically driven neo-liberal globalization process include, he argues:

1. Unemployed ‘surplus people’, whom nobody wants and nobody needs. Automated industries and digitalized communications no longer merely exploit. They also produce more and more of these surplus people.

2. Future generations, which will have to pay off the mountains of debt which present generations are heaping up so that they can enjoy their own present existence.

3. Nature, which is being driven into ecological catastrophe and left ‘without form and void’

4. This present system itself, which is going to founder on the contradictions it produces, and will annihilate the human race unless history is opened up afresh, and real alternatives emerge which will make this system reformable. (278-79)

In response to this, Moltmann notes two main avenues of attack we might well all be familiar with (at least in the US): ‘the conservative syndrome’ and the ‘progressive syndrome’ (268-77). The conservative syndrome is one that seeks to delay (or even stop) the coming of the future by the construction of a ‘blockade’ built out of trusted ideologies of the past; conversely, the progressive syndrome seeks to manage the coming of the future by ‘occupying’ it with administrative, pragmatic solutions of ‘solvable problems’.\textsuperscript{14} For many policymakers, the ‘progressive syndrome’ seems a workable program to follow by addressing the above-noted challenges; yet, Moltmann holds (from a Christian perspective) that it precludes the possibility of transforming the future into something truly sustainable and life-giving. Coming from a labor-studies perspective, Ross seems (at places) to imply his hopes of labour solidarity as a way to transform the long-term situation facing knowledge workers and institutions in the new ‘post-ideological’ age, but his actual short-term policy expectations are quite (somewhat surprisingly) subdued. Looking to the rise of the ‘global university’ he answers (Locations 3822-3832)

Indeed, the ‘coevolution’ of academic and corporate entities might well result in a blended management style that will liberalize the corporation as much as it constrains the university, Ross (perhaps optimistically) hopes. In this reviewer’s ‘eschatology’ of higher education, he finds that Ross, can perhaps hope with Moltmann that each one of us (whatever our personal function and social role) can somehow gain productive, practical political power (amidst the relentless political-economic determined work both fallen syndromes present us with), but cannot expect much system-wide transformation. For Ross, his quietude might be because Americans have seen too many revolutions being co-opted and absorbed by the dominant culture, not fought out (the Civil War excepted),\textsuperscript{15} (After all, we Americans, both left and right, often seek to ‘own’ the future for our lesser ends and still want to call it God’s work too!) While Ross would surely not be one to ‘blockade’ the future of higher education in society via the ‘conservative syndrome’, one could argue that his own ‘progressive’ higher education policy proscriptions might well ‘occupy’ the future via an administratively competent cosmopolitanism.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13} Moltmann continues: ‘If, now that the socialism of the eastern bloc has come to an end, there are no longer any alternatives to this global and total system, then an “end of history” or “the end of a history” has indeed been reached, and with it a “brave new world” without any other threatening options. The millenaristic conception of history is in sight. In 1989 the most recent secular, Hegelian millenarian, Francis Fukuyama, of the State Department in Washington, proclaimed “the end of history”; and from these viewpoints he was right. But Karl Marx too must posthumously be called correct: for globalized and totalized capitalism conforms precisely to his scenario, with the sole qualification that there is now no transition to a post-capitalist socialism and communism. On the contrary, it is the transition from socialism to capitalism which is to be “the end of history”’ (276).

\textsuperscript{14} The work of the Gates Foundation, the Clinton Foundation, etc., in addressing ‘known problems/know solutions’ in development (such as developing a malaria vaccine and an HIV and AIDS vaccine) is good (and effective) examples of this approach. Economist Jeffrey Sacks exemplifies the approach too, but with mixed results. See: French, H. W. (2013). The Not-So-Great Professor: Jeffrey Sachs’ Incredible Failure to Eradicate Poverty in Africa. Pacific Standard, 17 September. Retrieved: http://www.psmsmag.com/culture/smart-guy-jeffrey-sachs-naa-munk-idealistic-poverty-failure-africa-65346 (30 October, 2013).


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